Canonical Ethereum Bridge Provider: Approval Voting Procedures & Reciprocal Expectations for Bridge Provision

Voting YES to this Proposal means that you assent to using the following procedures to vote for a Canonical Ethereum Bridge Service Provider (BSP) for app.osmosis.zone, a relationship whose initial, mutable expectations are outlined below.\n\nVoting NO means you do not assent to these procedures and expectations. VETO and ABSTAIN have their normal functions.\n\nLIMITATION OF SCOPE: A YES vote assents to these procedures ONLY for the series of five Osmosis governance proposals outlined below. To guard against malicious or confusing proposals, only proposals made by osmo19mywfjzj324w5ukf7ss6jak0dg9hnljfp0rfx4 will be considered under these rules. Future use of these (or similar) procedures must be separately approved by governance.\n\nAPPROVAL VOTING PROCEDURES: Five Osmosis Governance Proposals will be proposed under these rules, one each for the four bridge service providers being voted upon: 1) Axelar, 2) Gravity Bridge, 3) Nomad, and 4) Wormhole, as well as 5) a “do nothing” proposal.\n\nWINNER: The Bridge Service Provider (BSP) proposal (or “do nothing”) from this set that receives the highest total amount of YES voting power at the end of the collective voting period will win, provided that QUORUM is reached and a RUN-OFF is not activated. That BSP will enter into a relationship with Osmosis DAO whose initial parameters are outlined below.\n\nNO, NO WITH VETO, and ABSTAIN votes will have NO EFFECT on the tally of yes voting power for the approval voting results. In other words, a bridge could win the approval vote even if it has more NO/VETO vote power than YES, as long as it has the most YES voting power among the BSP proposals.\n\nQUORUM: As long as the total YES voting power received across the 5 approval voting proposals is equivalent to regular Osmosis quorum (20% of total Osmosis voting power), quorum will be considered to have been reached.\n\nRUN-OFF: At the end of the collective voting period, any BSP or “do nothing” proposal that has received within 15% of the leading proposal’s total will be entered into a run-off governed by these same rules and expectations, except that the run-off result will be final, with no further run-offs. This 15% will be measured as a percentage of the total voting power available on Osmosis for this set of proposals (NOT 15% of the top vote-getter’s YES voting power).\nFor example, assuming 122M total staked OSMO available to vote, the 15% run-off spread is 18.3M. Therefore, if Bridge X gets 53M YES voting power, Bridge Y gets 35M, and Bridge Z gets 25M, Bridges X and Y will be entered into a run-off.\n\nBRIDGE SERVICE PROVIDER RELATIONSHIP EXPECTATIONS:\nThe Osmosis DAO is asking Osmosis Labs to integrate the BSP into app.osmosis.zone to provide canonical, unprefixed bridged assets from Ethereum. The implementation details will be left to Osmosis Labs and the chosen BSP, but the general shape of the initial expectations is as follows. These expectations are subject to change as circumstance, future governance, and social consensus dictate.\n\nFrom Osmosis, the BSP can expect:\nDefault Asset List – the Ethereum assets bridged by the selected provider will be unprefixed in the app.osmosis.zone default asset list – i.e. their bridged ETH and ERC-20 assets will be ETH, USDC, etc., all other bridges' assets would be bridge1ETH, bridge2USDC, and the like. Osmosis DAO requests that allied/friendly front-ends do the same, though any front-end is free to make its own decisions. In the near future, we expect custom token lists to become the norm in Cosmos, as they are on Ethereum, so that users can search for and import tokens that they want to interact with.\nOsmosis Incentives – the DAO commits to prioritizing the assets of the canonical bridge, incentivizing them earlier and more heavily than the comparable assets of non-canonical bridges. In general, canonical pools should earn substantially more incentives per dollar of liquidity than their counterpart pools–under the base incentives model, not necessarily counting external incentive matching.\nIntegration – Osmosis expects to work closely with the BSP. At the discretion of the Osmosis developers (subject to the advice and consent of the DAO) Osmosis will use the selected BSP for bridges beyond Ethereum (EVM or otherwise), unless another or better bridge is already available that the service provider cannot match (within whatever timeframe the Osmosis developers or DAO finds reasonable).\n\nFrom the BSP, Osmosis can expect:\nIntegration / Availability – the BSP will help optimize integrations in a timely manner in accordance with Osmosis’ stated goals of achieving deposits and withdrawals from the app.osmosis.zone UI and Keplr Wallet (without pass-through to the bridge UI).\nLiquidity Mining Incentives – if a project’s proposal included the promise of incentives (e.g. Axelar, at least 1% of Axelar tokens to be used for incentives on Osmosis).\n\nRevocability / At-will / Permissionless: As noted, these expectations are preliminary and subject to change as the DAO, developers, and the bridge team see fit. Osmosis DAO and the BSP will be working with each other for their mutual benefit, without contractual promise or obligation. It will be up to the BSP team to maintain a good relationship with Osmosis Labs regarding the front-end implementation details. Osmosis DAO empowers Osmosis Labs to change BSPs if in their estimation, the relationship has become unworkable, or the technical landscape suggests a superior solution, subject to ratification by the DAO.\nShould the arrangement become unworkable for either party for whatever reason, the arrangement can be changed or terminated without notice. Any damages for bad behavior (broken promises, bridge failures) will be to reputation alone. Specific promises between the BSP and an individual user (e.g. bridge insurance) are not covered by this disclaimer, nor are potential future agreements between the DAO and various developers, teams, or individuals.\n\nFurther details and discussion: https://gov.osmosis.zone/discussion/4482-osmosis-canonical-ethereum-bridge-proposals